2024-04-15
34 分钟The psychologist Daniel Kahneman — a Nobel laureate and the author of “Thinking, Fast and Slow” — recently died at age 90. Along with his collaborator Amos Tversky, he changed how we all think about decision-making. The journalist Michael Lewis told the Kahneman-Tversky story in a 2016 book called "The Undoing Project." In this episode, Lewis explains why they had such a profound influence.
Hey there, it's Stephen Dubner.
The psychologist and Nobel laureate Daniel Kahneman recently died at age 90.
If you've been a regular listener to freakonomics radio over the years, you've likely heard us talk about Kahneman.
He became famous for his 2011 book thinking fast and slow, but it was his decades of earlier research, much of it done with his collaborator Amos Tversky, that revolutionized not only psychology, but helped create the field of behavioral economics.
Their ideas hinged on the observation that we humans aren't nearly as rational as standard economic theory would have us believe.
In 2016, the journalist Michael Lewis told the Kahneman Tversky story in his book the Undoing a Friendship that changed our minds.
We spoke with Lewis about that book when it was published, and I wanted to replay that episode now in memory of Danny Kahneman.
If this episode doesn't fully satisfy your Kahneman curiosity, don't worry.
We have just begun work on a proper retrospective of his life and career.
If all goes well, you will hear that in a few months.
As always, thanks for listening.
There aren't many people in the world who write excellent books that also get turned into excellent films.
Among them is this guy.
My name is Michael Lewis and I just think of myself as a writer.
What makes Michael Lewis rare feat even rarer is that his books wouldn't seem at all conducive to the Hollywood treatment books like Moneyball, which was about the.
Way the oakland a managed to function on a shoestring budget in Major League Baseball.
And the book was, in my mind, really about the way the market for baseball players misvalued those players.
The then experts in baseball scouts would make big mistakes in deciding who was a good player and who wasn't a good player.
And the A's were exploiting this by using statistical analysis.
The problem we're trying to solve is that there are rich teams and there are poor teams, then there's 50ft of crap and then there's us.