This is philosophy bites with me, David.
Edmonds, and me, Nigel Warburton.
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If everything I do is the result of earlier causes, is free will an illusion?
Determinists believe that all our action can be given a causal explanation.
A murderer's decision to wield an axe could be explained by a whole series of causes and effects, including genetic causes, environmental causes, neurons firing in the killer's brain, and so on.
For a determinist, there doesn't seem to be any room for real choice.
So if I murder someone, on that view, how could I be held morally responsible?
How could anyone justify punishing anyone else?
Greg Caruso discusses this thorny problem.
Greg Caruso, welcome to philosophy Bites.
Thank you very much for having me, David.
The topic we're discussing today is free will and punishment.
Can you try and encapsulate what the problem is?
Yes.
First, let me say that I define free will in terms of moral responsibility.
So for me, what's really at stake.
The central philosophical and practical debate is about whether we have a certain kind of control and action that would be required for basic dessert moral responsibility.